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Abstract
The Tactical Decision Making Under Stress
(TADMUS) program is being conducted to
apply recent developments in decision the-
ory and human-system interaction technol-
ogy to the design of a decision support sys-
tem for enhancing tactical decision making
under the highly complex conditions in-
volved in antiair warfare scenarios in litto-
ral environments. Our goal is to present de-
cision support information in a format that
minimizes any mismatches between the
cognitive characteristics of the human deci-
sion maker and the design and response
characteristics of the decision support sys-
tem. Decision makers are presented with
decision support tools which parallel the
cognitive strategies they already employ,
thus reducing the number of decision-
making errors. Hence, prototype display
development has been based on decision-
making models postulated by naturalistic
decision-making theory. Incorporating cur-
rent human-system interac-tion design
principles is expected to reduce cognitive
processing demands and thereby mitigate
decision errors caused by cogni-tive over-
load, which have been documented through
research and experimentation. Topics
_________________________________
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include a discussion of:  (1) the theoretical
background for the TADMUS program; (2)
a description of the cognitive tasks per-
formed;  (3) the decision support and hu-
man-system interaction design principles
incorporated to reduce the cognitive proc-
essing load on the decision maker; and (4) a
brief description of the types of errors
made by decision makers and interpreta-
tions of the cause of these errors based on
the cognitive psychology literature.
1  Introduction
Recent changes in U.S. Naval priorities stress the
requirement for navy ships to operate in the litto-
ral regions of the world, that is, in the coastline
regions. Operating in the congested and confined
water and airspace close to land presents
additional challenges to the tactical decision
maker. Littoral operations involve scenarios char-
acterized by rapidly unfolding events which fit
multiple possible hypotheses with respect to con-
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tact identification, intent, available responses and
their consequences. For example, the close prox-
imity of U.S. Navy forces and potential adversary
forces makes interpreting the actions of an in-
bound aircraft who does not respond to radio
warnings much more difficult. Should the air-
craft's behavior be interpreted as an attack profile,
or does the pilot merely intend to harass, or does
the aircraft in question not carry the equipment
necessary to receive verbal warnings, leaving the
pilot unable to  receive radio warnings directed
toward him and unaware of his precarious posi-
tion? In extreme cases there is no clear cut right or
wrong answer about a decision. Rapidly unfolding
events result in severe time pressure and severe
(often catastro-phic) consequences for errors.
While current real-time battle management sys-
tems are well-suited to the demands of all-out
conflicts, they may not be optimized for littoral
situations where human intervention in decision-
making is even more important (Office of Naval
Technology [ONT], 1992). (Since 70 percent of
the world's population lives within 200 miles of
the sea, most future contingencies are likely to
involve littoral warfare (Mundy, 1994).)
Two unfortunate and highly publicized events
focused attention on the difficult types of deci-
sions confronting naval commanders and provided
the impetus for this research. In the case of the
U.S.S. Stark, the commander made the decision to
not engage an inbound aircraft which was be-
lieved to not be a threat to his ship, and 27 U.S.
naval personnel lost their lives as a result. In the
case of the U.S.S. Vincennes, the commander
made the decision to engage the inbound aircraft
believing it was a threat to his ship—which turned
out to be a commercial airliner—and all personnel
aboard the airliner were killed as a result. In rec-
ognition of the complex and difficult decisions
required in these types of situations the Tactical
Decision Making Under Stress (TADMUS) pro-
gram was initiated to conduct research in the areas
of human factors and training technology. The
objective is to develop and apply principles that
can help avoid these types of situations in the fu-
ture. This paper, and a two companion papers
(Hutchins, Kelly, & Morrison, 1996; Kelly,
Hutchins, & Morrison, 1996), report on a multi-
year, multi-experiment research effort conducted
under the TADMUS program to apply recent de-
velopments in decision theory and human-system
interaction technology to the design of a decision
support system (DSS) for enhancing tactical deci-
sion making under highly complex conditions.
1.1 "Naturalistic" and Classical Decision-Making Para-
digms
In the same time frame that these tragic acci-
dents occurred, a radical shift was occurring in the
way psychologists viewed human decision mak-
ing. Research was now focused on experienced
decision makers performing their normal tasks in
natural settings. "Naturalistic" decision-making
research studies the decision strategies people ac-
tually use in bringing their expertise to bear under
challenging real-world conditions. Decision
making milieus encompassed under the naturalis-
tic paradigm include hospital emergency rooms,
aircrew flight coordination, military command and
control settings, process control systems, and po-
lice and fire units.
The naturalistic perspective, also known as
"everyday cognition," is based on a belief that
cognitive functions "elicited in natural settings
(are) likely to differ, either quantitatively, or
qualitatively, from those that occur in artificial or
contrived situations, and results from sterile and
contrived situations may not generalize to less
constrained and more natural environments"
(Salthouse, 1992, p. 982). There is a growing
body of work that demonstrates that experienced,
real-world decision makers rarely use traditional
resource intensive strategies to make decisions in
the face of dynamic, adverse conditions and time-
pressure (Kaempf & Militelo, 1992; Klein, 1989;
1993). Instead, experts rely on their abilities to
recognize and appropriately classify situations:
these abilities are based on having much experi-
ence in the task domain. Once they know what
they are facing they also tend to know what re-
sponse option to apply, based on retrieval from
memory of typical responses and outcomes that
worked well in past similar situations. They use
the limited time available to evaluate the feasibil-
ity of that option before implementing it. Experi-
enced decision makers recognize the situation or
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scenario based on a comparison of the features of
the current situation with stored memory represen-
tations, or schemata. Schemata are highly inter-
con-nected clusters of knowledge concerning cer-
tain situations, or particular problem types, and
associated actions or solution procedures (Fede-
rico, 1995). Once the situation is recognized, so-
lutions are stimulated by activation of these mem-
ory representations.
In contrast to the naturalistic perspective, ear-
lier analytical methods applied in decision support
systems were primarily used for option generation
and evaluation, rather than for situation assess-
ment. Traditional decision theorists argue that op-
timum decision making involves thorough analy-
sis of all the available data and the evaluation of
all possible hypotheses; these approaches tend to
rely on extensive calculations designed to arrive at
optimal solutions. Processes for making decisions
where the person weighs the pros and cons of
various options and selects the one option that
provides the most benefit are described in the de-
cision making literature. The extensive time re-
quirements and complicated mathematical calcu-
lations involved (e.g., Multi-Attribute Utility
Analysis), however, make these approaches unre-
alistic for situations requiring rapid decision
making. Generally, these analytical strategies in-
volve the following steps (Kaempf & Militello,
1992):
•  specify all relevant features of the task;
•  identify the full range of options;
•  identify the key evaluation dimensions;
•  identify weights for each dimension;
•  rate each option on each dimension;
•  tabulate the results, and
•  select the best option.
These analytical strategies may be appropriate for
inexperienced subjects making decisions about
novel tasks, but not for experienced personnel
making real-time decisions. In natural settings,
time constraints and the difficulty in assigning
weights and rating the dimensions involved render
classical analysis techniques untenable. Typically
in realistic settings experts employ recognition-
based reasoning, not classical analytical ap-
proaches. Experienced decision makers use their
extensive knowledge to seek information, identify
and interpret the problem, understand the signifi-
cance, derive the intention (where possible),
model the situation (as time allows), select the
action, evaluate the choice, and anticipate the con-
sequence. "This decision cycle is distinctly differ-
ent from classical models, which are based on the
assumption that all options, outcomes, and prefer-
ences are known and calculated in advance"
(Federico, 1995, p. 106).
Traditionally, research in decision making has
been directed largely toward situations in which
(1) decision makers have sufficient time to gener-
ate options, conduct option assessment, and select
a course of action; (2) the consequences of an in-
correct response are not immediately severe; (3)
decisions are reached via consensus of a group;
and (4) workload is manageable. Little research
has been conducted into the development of tacti-
cal decision support systems for use in naturalistic
situations characterized by time pressure, high
risk, uncertainty and information ambiguity, high
workload, team coordination demands and task
complexity (ONT, 1992).
The central hypothesis for the research re-
ported here is that presenting decision makers
with decision support tools which were designed
to parallel the cognitive strategies employed by
experts, as observed in naturalistic settings, will
reduce the number of decision making errors. This
is accomplished by developing the architecture
and algorithms to process information the same
way research indicates humans do under similar
circumstances.
2   Tactical Decision Making Tasks
The global tactical decision-making task involves
identification of and responding to numerous
contacts. When an aircraft (or a surface contact) is
detected the CIC personnel work as a team to de-
termine the identity and to try to determine
whether or not the aircraft poses a threat. The high
degree of inherent ambiguity associated with
contact information can often make threat assess-
ment a very difficult task. This is because many
pieces of data fit multiple hypotheses regarding
threat assessment. The global response choices
(that is, engage, monitor, do nothing) are largely
determined by the ship's orders and the current
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geopolitical situation. Specific actions (such as,
change course, issue verbal warnings, illuminate
with radar, challenge with other sensors, etc.) de-
pend on the local conditions and the relative posi-
tions of the inbound contact of interest and own-
ship. Determining which of these actions is likely
to be effective depends on maintaining an accurate
threat assessment which requires "continual up-
dating in accordance with recurrent situation as-
sessments" (Sarter & Woods, 1991, p. 52).
This decision problem presents a highly chal-
lenging cognitive task, that is, making inferences
and deductions from incomplete and uncertain
information derived from multiple sources and
relating to several concurrent threats (or potential
threats) under time-compressed conditions. The
cognitive functions performed by the tactical deci-
sion maker are both data and resource limited
(Norman & Bobrow, 1975). Decisions are re-
source limited by the mental resources of the deci-
sion makers, who must maintain large amounts of
information in memory under conditions of high
workload and stress. The decisions are data lim-
ited by the inability of the sensors to provide
complete, error-free, unambiguous data to support
the identification process. In particular, the ex-
perimental scenarios were designed to follow the
pattern of being set in an ambiguous situation
where one or more threats of uncertain origin and
uncertain intent approach either own ship or the
ship being protected and may not respond to
warnings. Scenarios were designed to be highly
ambiguous, as this quality of uncertainty is in-
dicative of the types of decisions to be made in
current and future scenarios.
2.1  Threat Assessment
In the antiair warfare problem, threat assess-
ment is particularly difficult because the available
information is often incomplete or ambiguous.
The ambiguity could be due to (a) the information
transmission characteristics of the transmission
medium, such as a radar transmission or a radio
report that is only intercepted on an intermittent
basis, (b) deliberate deceptive actions (such as ra-
dar jamming) by the pilot flying the aircraft, or (c)
the overlapping classification categories typical of
many parameter measure-ments. For example, air-
craft can typically fly at altitudes ranging between
2,000 and 40,000 feet. Generally, an aircraft that
is flying above 20,000 feet is not considered to be
a threat. Conversely, an aircraft below 10,000 ft is
considered to be more of a potential threat.  How-
ever, aircraft flying in the middle range, (that is,
below 20,000 ft. and above 10,000 ft.) can be
much more difficult to categorize. Because many
aircraft do fly in this middle range, other variables
need to be considered in conjunction with altitude.
This same situation of overlapping categorization
categories exists for several other variables. These
variables include radars that are found on both
threat and non-threat platforms, country of origin,
and measures of course and speed. In the case of
speed, for example, when an aircraft flying at a
low altitude decreases speed this could be viewed
as indicative of a threat action (that is, slowing
down in order to obtain better targeting informa-
tion); however, at the same time, there could be
other viable explanations for an aircraft's de-
creasing speed.
If the decision maker had access to all data
about a contact approximately twelve variables
would be used to determine identity and to infer
intent. Two or three of these items, alone, do not
provide definitive answers because, in many
cases, these parameter values do not fall within
clear-cut ranges for a particular assessment cate-
gory (i.e., threat, non-threat). Thus, a single time
slice of information provides an incomplete pic-
ture of the situation. In the dynamic, ambiguous
conditions characteristic of littoral operations, the
rate and direction of change (data history) can
help one better assess the threat and predict the
future state of the situation. When the incoming
information changes over time, the integration of
information as it changes can help the user extract
the message (Kirshenbaum, 1992). The DSS was
designed to do precisely this: to facilitate the inte-
gration process and present a synthesized picture
of the situation to the user in a format that can be
quickly assimilated. The variables, that are used to
develop a threat assessment, can be divided into
two classes: sensor information (raw or computer-
processed information) and the contact's response,
or lack of response, to actions taken by the team.
These other actions, and the integration of the in-
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formation received via the contact's response or
lack of response to them, are necessary to clarify
the tactical picture.
2.2  Situation Awareness
While recent increasing interest among re-
searchers regarding the concept of situation
awareness (SA) has generated a debate on the pre-
cise definition of this term most researchers ac-
knowledge the importance of the concept. In gen-
eral, SA refers to the decision maker's moment-
by-moment ability to monitor and understand the
state of the complex system and its environment
(Adams, Tenney, & Pew, 1995). These authors
state the essential idea which is that when emer-
gencies arise, the completeness and accuracy of
the decision maker's SA are critical to the ability
to make decisions, revise plans, and manage the
system. Specific decision-making tasks included
under SA include the ability to:  (1) maintain an
accurate perception of the surrounding environ-
ment (both internal and external to the ship); (2)
identify problems and/or potential problems; (3)
recognize a need for action; (4) note deviations in
the mission; and (5) maintain awareness of tasks
performed (Shrestha, Prince, Baker and Salas,
1995). To maintain an accurate SA the decision
maker should take into account both information
that is available and that which can be activated
from memory (Sarter and Woods, 1991).
However, a difficulty arises as a result of the
heavy workload imposed by this process. When
the decision maker is faced with several concur-
rent contacts of interest, all of which have numer-
ous associated data items (i.e., as many as  a
dozen), some or all of which may change over the
course of the scenario (e.g., intelligence, active
radar emitters, various kinematic parameters, etc.)
memory load easily exceeds human capacity.
Moreover, changing parameters may impart dif-
ferent interpretations to what is occurring. In some
cases the moment-to-moment attentional demands
of a tactical situation are relentless and unforgiv-
ing (such as, a terrorist aircraft directly inbound
toward "own-ship" which can result in "task fixa-
tion"), sometimes relevant background knowledge
is unavoidably incomplete (such as, an unfamiliar
aircraft), and sometimes the decision maker is al-
ready thinking and working as hard as possible,
even when there are no unanticipated events when
there is a high contact density (Adams, et al,
1995). These instances provide a few illustrations
of situations that can degrade situation awareness.
Complex information gathering and process-
ing systems have been designed to aid the deci-
sion-maker in the past. However, these systems
often increase the decision-maker’s burden due to
the inherent system complexity and the failure to
design them in a way that they will fit the user's
cognitive processing limitations. Often, these
systems require operators to perform difficult
cognitive tasks under heavy workloads. They must
perceive, synthesize and determine the relevance
of a continual stream of incoming information,
often pertaining to several concurrent contacts,
while projecting future anticipated events and
making decisions regarding actions to be taken.
Decision makers must assess, compare, and re-
solve conflicting information, while making diffi-
cult judgments, and remembering the status of
critical contacts along with the contact's response
to actions taken by the CIC team. These decision-
making tasks are interleaved with other required
tasks, such as keeping other team members in-
formed (both on and off the ship). Furthermore,
these complex tasks are performed under condi-
tions where adverse environmental (noise, vibra-
tion, temperature extremes, etc.) and internal
stressors (boredom, fatigue, anxiety, and fear) are
part of the environment.
3  Decision Support Principles
A case has been made that previous generations of
decision support systems, which focus primarily
on solution optimization and base decision sup-
port on normative models of human decision
making, are less applicable than a DSS that par-
allels the cognitive strategies used by domain ex-
perts in situations characterized by time-
constrained situations with uncertain and ambigu-
ous data (Smith & Grossman, 1993).  These
authors point out that rarely, if ever, were earlier
tactical decision aids intended as psychological
models of human cognitive behavior.  Instead,
these aids performed "complex and burdensome
calculations, reducing the work-load on personnel,
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speeding up the dissemination of information, and
providing more time for command decision mak-
ing" (Tolcott, 1991, p. 44).
3.1  Feature Matching and Story Generation
We have applied two of these new models of
human decision making—which parallel the cog-
nitive strategies used by domain experts—to the
design of a DSS for enhancing antiair warfare
tactical decision making. These two models that
people use in assessing a situation are feature
matching and story generation. The feature
matching model, described by Noble (1989), in-
volves an organization of memory, or "schemas,"
and information-processing where decision mak-
ers use their previous experiences to assess a
situation and identify promising actions. Incoming
information is categorized, selected, edited, and
organized on the basis of a person's general
knowledge about a domain. Both story generation
and feature matching occur under conditions
where a large base of implication-rich, condition-
ally dependent pieces of evidence must be evalu-
ated before choosing an alternative from a set of
prospective courses of action. The feature match-
ing model applies a spatio-temporal dependence,
whereas story generation is an example of causal
dependence. According to the explanation-based
model, decision makers construct a causal model
to explain the available evidence (Pennington &
Hastie, 1993). At the same time, the decision
maker creates a set of alternatives from which an
action will be chosen.  A decision is made when a
story is successfully matched to an alternative in
the choice set. Story generation occurs in complex
situations where the decision maker may not have
all the necessary information or when a series of
facts may appear to contradict each other. The de-
cision maker must then develop causal links be-
tween these facts to produce a coherent picture of
the situation (Klein, 1989; 1993).
The explanation-based reasoning model is
based on research which found that jurors develop
a narrative story to organize trial information
where causal and intentional relations between
events are central (Pennington & Hastie, 1992).
Pennington & Hastie propose four certainty prin-
ciples—coverage, coherence, uniqueness, and
goodness-of-fit—that govern (i) which story will
be accepted, (ii) which decision will be selected,
and the (iii) confidence or degree of certainty with
which a particular decision will be made. This or-
ganization of the evidence by the decision maker
is believed to facilitate evidence comprehension.
A central component of this model is that the
story the juror constructs determines the juror's
decision.  This explanation-based decision process
is employed when the body of evidence relevant
to a decision is large, complex, and the implica-
tions of its components are interdependent.
Feature matching, also referred to as the rec-
ognition-primed decision (RPD) model, "occurs
when the decision maker recognizes the features
of the present situation as similar or identical to
those of a previous situation" (Kaempf & Militelo,
1992, p. 6). An adequate match triggers recall of
information learned about this type of situation:
(a) plausible goals, (b) critical cues to be moni-
tored, (c) expectations of what should happen, and
(d) a course of action that worked in similar situa-
tions. According to this recent approach, expert
decision makers may rely on well-developed
memory representations to guide decision making
in new (but similar) situations. The RPD model of
decision making fuses two processes—situation
assessment and mental simulation (Klein, 1993).
In the simplest case the situation is recognized as
familiar or prototypical, using feature matching,
and the obvious response is implemented. In a
more complex case the decision maker performs a
conscious evaluation of the response, using men-
tal simulation to uncover problems prior to im-
plementing the response. In the most complex
case the evaluation reveals flaws requiring modi-
fication, or the option is judged inadequate and
rejected in favor of the next most typical reaction.
3.2  Situation Assessment
In general, the overall task of responding to
antiair warfare scenarios consists of situation as-
sessment ("what's going on") and course of action
selection ("what to do about it"). Recent theories
of decision making emphasize the importance of
situation assessment for good decision making in
naturalistic, event-driven situations. Moreover,
they stress that decisions regarding actions to be
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taken are a by-product of developing the situation
awareness that precedes action selection. Klein
(1989) has found that usually the situation itself
either determines or constrains the response op-
tions and that experienced decision makers make
up to 90% of all decisions without considering
alternatives. If the situation appears similar to one
that the decision maker has previously experi-
enced, the pattern will be recognized and the
course of action is usually immediately obvious.
On the other hand, if the situation does not seem
familiar complex RPD will be involved where the
decision maker adjusts the option after evaluating
it.
Additional evidence was found in the specific
task domain of interest to the TADMUS program
which added support to these findings on the way
real-world decision makers make decisions in the
context of their normal jobs. Research was con-
ducted to determine decision requirements for
command-level decision makers in the combat
information center (CIC) of an Aegis cruiser.
Analysis of 14 incidents from actual problems re-
vealed 183 decisions. Of these, 103 concerned
situation assessments. Results obtained after ana-
lysts coded these situation assessments indicated
that decision makers arrived at approximately
87% of their situation assessments through feature
matching and the remaining 13% through story
generation (Kaempf, Wolf, & Miller, 1993). The
other eighty decisions that were identified, from
analysis of the real-world incidents mentioned
above, involved course of action selection. These
course of action decisions served a variety of
functions, although, relatively few were intended
to end the incident. Twenty were intended as a
final course of action decision; 14 were imple-
mented to obtain more information, 22 to manage
resources, and 24 to put themselves in a more fa-
vorable tactical position. A recognition-based
strategy was also used by decision makers to de-
velop a course of action, accounting for 95% of
the actions taken in the 14 incidents. The decision
makers generated and compared multiple options
in only 5% of the cases. In line with these find-
ings, the TADMUS program has adopted the po-
sition that decision aiding systems should assist in
the decision making process, and focus on aiding
the situation assessment portion of the decision-
making task.
A DSS was developed to support decision-
making processes which research has shown are
used by decision makers in real-world settings
(Hutchins, Kelly, & Morrison, 1996). Specifi-
cally, the DSS parallels the strategies used by ex-
perienced decision makers to perform situation
assessment (Nobel, 1989; 1993). This approach to
supporting the user's intuitive approach to dealing
with dynamic decision-making situations should
produce tools that are both more easily understood
and used, and that more effectively "exploit the
decision maker's knowledge and expertise that
might facilitate adaptation to complex, novel
situations" (Cohen, 1993, p. 265).
4  Human-System Interaction Principles
The vast majority of research on human-computer
interaction design has been devoted to character-
istics of displays that impact human perception,
such as symbol legibility or detectability, and on
relatively simple cognitive functions such as
memory tasks. Fewer efforts have been devoted to
understanding the effects of the format and man-
ner in which information is presented on more
complex levels of human cognition such as deci-
sion making. Consequently, principles that can be
applied to the design of the interface between the
user and a decision support system for the purpose
of enhancing cognitive changing situations, are
not available to any significant degree (ONT,
1992).
4.1  Graphic Presentations
Several advantages are offered by graphic
presentations over a text-based presentation for-
mat (Larkin and Simon, 1987). Graphic presenta-
tions should (1) reduce the amount of mental
computation required to perform tasks; and (2)
allow users to spend less time searching for
needed information. Casner (1991) elaborated on
these ideas and found that graphics allow users to
substitute less demanding perceptual opera-tions
for more complex logical operations. For exam-
ple, determining a change in altitude (and the de-
gree of change) is immediately apparent when the
user glances at the track history module. (Note
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that the words contact and track can be used inter-
changeably. The reader is referred to Figure 1.)
The objective for the track history module is
to facilitate the contact identification process by
providing information that is integrated in a way
that supports a recognitional decision strategy.
This module depicts a contact’s speed, altitude,
course and range on a two-dimensional graphical
display along with a geometric representation of
both the contact’s weapon release envelope and
own-ship’s weapons coverage. A large amount of
parametric data is portrayed graphically for rapid
assimilation by the user. The user can see, at a
glance, a synthesized picture of the contact’s be-
havior. Compare this rather simple perceptual op-
eration with the more complex logical operation
involved in current operational systems which re-
quire the user to recall and subtract numerical val-
ues for past and current altitudes.
Graphics also allow users to omit steps that
are otherwise necessary when a task is performed
without a graphic. An example of this advantage
is
Figure 1.  Decision Support System Display Modules.
also illustrated in the track history module which
includes templates indicating weapon's coverage
for both the inbound contact and "own-ship." To
determine whether the aircraft is within its
weapon's launch range there is no need to recall
the specific launch range values and then compare
them with the aircraft's current range. Instead, the
user can determine if the aircraft is within its
launch range by a quick glance at the display.
Graphics help users save time when searching
for needed information when several related di-
mensions of information are encoded in a single
graphical object. This is accomplished by inte-
grating the kinematic parameters of speed, course,
altitude, bearing, and range for a contact. The user
can see, at a glance, a synthesized picture of the
contact's behavior.  Compare this process with
reading, in a text-based format, the individual pa-
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rameters which need to be integrated by the user
into a coherent picture of the contact's behavior.
5   Limited Cognitive Processing Capabilities
Since there are limits to the cognitive processing
capability of humans, it is important for the sys-
tem to provide the needed information in a format
that best supports the user operating under dy-
namic decision-making conditions. It may be the
case that current systems are inadequate to support
the cognitive processing demands required by
certain littoral scenarios. For example, according
to Gruner (1990, p. 41), the U.S.S. Vincennes of-
ficers and system operators "could not make better
decisions because they did not have time to con-
firm or deny the information uncertainties pre-
sented them." Gruner maintains that the rapid pace
involved in these types of situations can exceed
the capacity of the human to comprehend the
rapid flow of information presented by complex
systems. In the case of the Vincennes, the CIC
team had three minutes and 40 seconds to make
their decision. This includes the time required for
the operators to perceive and interpret sensor data
and for the commanding officer to make informed
judgments from these data (Roberts & Dotterway,
1995). The result of the human's limited cognitive
processing capabilities is that the decision makers
may fail to remember critical pieces of data,
overlook stored information, draw hasty conclu-
sions, and produce flawed answers.
Evidence of the effects of limitations in mem-
ory and shared attention capacity on human deci-
sion making were found during baseline testing
(Hutchins & Kowalski, 1994; Hutchins & Westra,
1995) and during empirical evaluation of the DSS
(Kelly, Hutchins, & Morrison, 1996; Kelly, Mor-
rison, & Hutchins. 1996).
Simon (1978, p. 273) states, "...the human in-
formation processing system...operates almost en-
tirely serially, one process at a time, rather than in
parallel fashion. This seriality is reflected in the
narrowness of its momentary focus of attention."
However, the AAW problem forces the decision
maker to operate in a parallel processing mode
when several contacts demand attention at the
same time. The requirement to monitor and
maintain an accurate SA for these concurrent
contacts, over the course of the evolving situation,
imposes an additional load of strategically man-
aging the overall situation. Several researchers
have argued that "managing the attentional and
conceptual processes that permit cogent SA in-
volves significant cognitive resources" (Adams, et
al, 1995, p. 91; Endsley, 1988). The tasks of pri-
oritizing contacts and the associated actions to be
taken by the team, updating the status of critical
contacts, responding to the other requisite tasks in
the queue and, more generally, of strategically
managing the workload of current multitask sys-
tems under dynamically changing scenarios can
place an unrealistic cognitive load on the decision
maker.
A major advantage offered by the experimen-
tal DSS is that it should "buy time" for the user by
(1) performing many of the cognitive processing
tasks for the user and (2) by presenting informa-
tion in graphic format. The DSS will synthesize
much of the information used to develop situation
awareness and present a coherent picture of the
situation to the user. This integrated picture will
be portrayed graphically—rather than in the cur-
rent text-based format—which should further re-
duce the amount of time required to assimilate
this information. By performing several informa-
tion processing steps for the decision maker the
decision maker's limited cognitive resources can
be used for the types of decisions which require
human abilities (e.g., the decision on whether to
engage).
5.1  Working Memory Requirements
An essential information processing step re-
quired by this task—and one which levies a heavy
load on working memory—involves integrating
kinematic and sensor variables and maintaining an
awareness of changes in these variables over time.
Changes in a contact's behavior such as, decreas-
ing altitude, increasing speed, changes in elec-
tronic emissions, etc., can provide key indicators
of possible hostile intent. With current systems,
the decision maker receives numerous reports
from CIC team members who provide various
pieces of the overall tactical picture (such as,
kinematic parameter values, active electronic
emitter identifications, and behavioral responses
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of the contact in response to queries by the team)
regarding a particular contact. Some of this infor-
mation is also displayed in a text-based format for
the user when a contact is "hooked" (that is, se-
lected for display) by the decision maker. How-
ever, to recognize a change in certain variables,
current systems require the user to retain parame-
ter values in short-term memory in order to recog-
nize a change in the parameter, such as altitude.
When the decision maker is monitoring sev-
eral concurrent contacts (such as, cycling through
three or four contacts in a 1-minute period) human
working memory capabilities may quickly be sur-
passed. To detect a change in a critical parameter
value, the decision maker must maintain the pa-
rameter values for the contacts of interest in
working memory as he or she cycles between sev-
eral contacts. For example, the decision maker
must be able to recall that contact 7022 was at
14,000 ft. altitude one minute ago, and then sub-
tract the current altitude value of 10,000 ft., which
will then indicate the aircraft is in a rapid descent.
The DSS was developed to aid the decision maker
by performing several of these cognitive process-
ing tasks, thus, reducing the cognitive load for the
user. By presenting the synthesized picture of the
contact's behavior over time, through the use of
graphical displays,  critical changes should be
immediately apparent to the user.
A second memory-intensive task involves
maintaining, in working memory, a current list of
actions taken by team members, the contact's re-
sponse to these actions taken by the CIC team,
and pending actions. Research has established that
"memory is limited and that list maintenance is
effortful and fallible—more so if the list must be
ordered and still more if the membership of the
list must be dynamically reordered and modified
during retention" (Bower, 1970, as cited in Ad-
ams, et al, 1995, p. 91).  The DSS should reduce
the cognitive effort required for distributing atten-
tion among the many contacts to be attended to
and actions that are required. Working memory
requirements should be reduced by having the
DSS act as an intelligent "assistant," reminding
the user regarding what actions are to be taken and
when the actions are to be taken.
A third way the DSS will reduce memory and
information processing requirements is by dis-
playing templates depicting weapons' envelopes
for both the inbound contact and "own-ship." This
should facilitate critical comparisons and judg-
ments regarding timing of actions. During a sce-
nario decision makers have to either rely on mem-
ory to recall the launch range for various weapons
or query a team member for this information. Both
of these methods waste limited resources. The
high workload and high tempo characteristic of
littoral scenarios produce a stress-ful decision-
making environment. The phenom-enon that in-
creasing stress leads to decreasing working mem-
ory is well documented (e.g., Hockey, 1986). The
latter method for obtaining the desired informa-
tion wastes limited resources by increasing the
communications load and requiring more time to
wait for a team members' response to the query
Under these high-tempo and high workload
conditions human memory and attentional re-
sources can easily be surpassed. Several cogni-
tively resource intensive information processing
steps are eliminated for the human decision maker
by having them performed by the DSS. We pre-
dict that the decision support tools will reduce the
cognitive workload imposed on the decision
maker in the following three ways: (1) by reduc-
ing the amount of information processing to be
performed, (2) reducing working memory re-
quirements, and (3) assisting the user in allocating
limited attentional resources.
5.2  Reducing Human Error
The study of human cognitive processes and
related error mechanisms has gained rapidly in-
creasing interest in the past decade. Rasmussen
(1987) argues that the emphasis in attempting to
understand human errors must shift from tasks to
the human-task mismatch.  For example, Gruner
(p. 39), in discussing the Vincennes incident,
maintains that "the system was poorly suited for
use by human beings during rapid military action."
He ascribes this lack of suitability to a human-
machine mismatch between the rate of data flow
possible with modern computer systems that can
process and display information at phenomenal
data rates and the "comprehension capability of
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users which has remained almost static for thou-
sands of years." This causal approach to under-
standing human error is based on the premise that
errors are rarely random and can be traced to
causes and contributing factors. Once these con-
tributing factors are identified they can be miti-
gated.
The impact and vulnerability of systems and
human interfaces, because of incompatibilities
between the way people perceive, think, and act,
are documented in the popular and technical lit-
erature (Buck, 1989; Casey, 1993; Norman, 1988;
Perrow, 1984; Wilson & Zarakas, 1978). Newly
developed systems will succeed or fail based on
our ability to minimize these incompat-ibilities
between the characteristics of the things we create
and the way we use them. There are many well-
documented instances of critical systems or pa-
rameter changes going unnoticed or unheeded be-
cause the operating procedures, or the human ma-
chine interface, provided no historical trace. For
example, an unnoticed increase in altitude con-
tributed to the shoot down of the Iranian airbus by
a U.S. Navy ship—when the team mistakenly be-
lieved the aircraft to be descending—because
there was no historical trace to make the aircraft's
actual increasing altitude apparent (Dotterway,
1992).  Five personnel in the U.S.S. Vincennes's
combat information center, all viewing separate
displays, reported the aircraft as descending while
the Aegis data tapes later revealed a flight pattern
of ascent (Roberts & Dotterway, 1995). One of the
official investiga-tions of this incident, the Fo-
garty Report (1988, p. 45), states that "stress, task
fixation, and an unconscious distortion of data
may have played a major role in this incident." A
panel of five psychologists from the American
Psychological Association who testified before
Congress concluded that there were "predictable
failings of human judgment under intense stress
compounded by complex technology [which]
clearly contributed to the accidental shooting of
Iranian airliner Flight 655" (APA, p. 4).
It is generally accepted that between 60-80
percent of the accidents and malfunctions in
transportation, manufacturing, process control,
weapon, and other systems are attributable to hu-
man error (Senders & Moray, 1991; Van Cott,
1993; Weiner, 1994). Reducing tactical decision
making errors is one goal of the TADMUS pro-
gram.  The following section presents a brief re-
view of an experiment conducted to develop a
baseline on tactical decision making performance
in response to fairly stressful scenarios. A com-
panion paper (Hutchins, Kelly, & Morrison, 1996)
describes the experimental DSS modules and the
way they are hypothesized to enhance tactical de-
cision making performance.
6   TADMUS Baseline Experiment
Early research involved data collection in the De-
cision-Making Evaluation Facility for Tactical
Teams (DEFTT) Laboratory using simulated ex-
isting shipboard displays to establish a baseline on
decision-making performance. The purpose of this
effort was to document baseline decision-making
performance for experienced naval officers. Dur-
ing the baseline phase of testing, a detailed under-
standing was developed of the cognitive processes
underlying the various tasks involved in situation
assessment—and where the bottlenecks occur.
This understanding was then used to design the
way the information is presented to the user in or-
der to facilitate performance of the required tasks.
6.1  Subjects
This study focused on the command-level de-
cision makers of an antiair warfare team on an
Aegis cruiser—the commanding officer and the
tactical action officer. Subjects in the study con-
sisted of six commanding officer/tactical action
officer teams drawn from twelve active duty Na-
val personnel; some were from training com-
mands while others were from operational com-
mands aboard ship or assigned to group staffs.
6.2  Procedure
Data were collected in the  DEFTT Labora-
tory, a six-station test-bed environment that
simulates console positions in a Navy Aegis
cruiser combat information center. (For a detailed
description of the DEFTT Laboratory see Hutch-
ins, 1996.) Four stations were filled by confeder-
ates (active duty Navy personnel) who play antiair
warfare support-team member roles. These roles
included the antiair warfare coordinator, identifi-
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cation supervisor, tactical information coordina-
tor, and electronic warfare supervisor. After ap-
proximately 1 1/2 hours of orientation to the labo-
ratory and training in the use of the computer con-
soles the subjects engaged in four scenarios. The
scenarios were each about 25 minutes in length
and contained between 11 and 14 contacts of in-
terest per scenario, in addition to numerous back-
ground contacts.
6.3  Treatment of Data
Team communications were recorded on a
multichannel audio recorder; these included all
intra-team exchanges, as well as all communica-
tions with simulated off-ship personnel. Audio
tapes were used to produce verbatim, time-
stamped transcripts of all team communications.
A modified version of the TapRoot® Incident In-
vestigation System (Paradies, 1991; Paradies and
Unger, 1991) was then applied to identify errors.
The objective was to identify tactically significant
errors committed during the scenario. Tactically
significant errors were defined as those errors that
may lead to loss of life or significant political em-
barrassment. The following criteria were used for
counting an error as tactically significant:  (1) loss
of situation awareness, (2) failure to take defen-
sive action when within the weapon's range of an
approaching contact, or (3) a violation of rules of
engagement (ROE). Video recordings were made
of the commanding officer and tactical action of-
ficer computer screens. Detailed analyses of all
audio and video recordings were conducted. (For
a more detailed coverage of the methodology and
results see Hutchins and Westra, in preparation).
6.4  Results
The complex, time-constrained, decision-
making situations embodied in the experimental
scenarios resulted in a large number of decision
errors. The mean number of tactically significant
errors documented across six teams and four sce-
narios was 14; the number of errors ranged from
nine to twenty-two. The standard deviation was
3.7.  Subjects performed an average of 50% of the
required behaviors as specified in the rules of en-
gagement. The ordinal agreement between three
raters (navy subject matter experts) on error count
ranks from TapRoot® analyses was computed.
Results showed a high degree of agreement with
the Kendall's W of .93 indicating that 93% of the
possible rank variance is accounted for.
6.4.1  Decision-Making Errors
Detailed examinations of the information
processing sequences performed during tactical
decision making have revealed a variety of errors.
On average, subjects failed to take required ac-
tions, about half of the time. Explanations based
in the cognitive psychology literature have been
pursued, as a major goal of the TADMUS pro-
gram is to develop a DSS based on an under-
standing of the way in which human decision
makers actually process information under rapidly
evolving situations.
The majority of documented errors involved
errors of omission, that is, "failure to take defen-
sive measures” and "failure to adhere to ROE.”
Failure to take defensive measures included fail-
ure to take actions to defend own-ship when an
approaching aircraft had reached its weapon's re-
lease range. An example involved a case where
two contacts were within the specified ROE limit,
yet no action had been taken. The types of actions
included in the “failure to adhere to ROE” cate-
gory include failure to take action regarding the
items listed and defined below: (a) issuing warn-
ings is part of the usual identification process and
involves three levels of warnings with increasing
levels of urgency; (b) establish friendly force cri-
teria refers to establishing a plan with other
friendly ships in the area to coordinate how they
will respond to potential threats; (c) changes in
kinematics/ identification friend or foe—subjects
are expected to notice significant kinematic
changes and/or identification friend or foe pa-
rameter changes; and (d) other identification pro-
cedures includes actions such as illuminating with
fire control radar.
The other major category of tactically signifi-
cant error involved “loss of SA.” Loss of SA er-
rors were grouped under errors of commission and
errors of omission and then further categorized
into subgroups. Fifty-five percent of the loss of
SA errors involved taking the wrong action (error
of commission) while 45% of the errors involved
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failing to take some required action (error of
omission). Error categories included under errors
of commission involved incorrectly engaging a
track (3%), incorrectly warning a track (29%),
other incorrect actions (16%), and incorrect re-
porting (7%). The two instances of incorrectly en-
gaging an aircraft, which were F-1 Mirage aircraft,
were considered errors because the decision
maker failed to take certain actions prior to en-
gaging—not necessarily because the aircraft
should not have been engaged. The actions that
the decision makers failed to take involved ascer-
tain-ing the identification of the aircraft for one
case and failure to warn and illuminate the aircraft
prior to engaging for the second case. Most in-
stances of incorrectly issuing warnings to the air-
craft involved issuing the warning when the air-
craft was within its territorial airspace (that is, in-
side the 12 nautical mile limit which is interna-
tionally recognized as under control of that nation)
or issuing a warning at a level different from what
was required. Other incorrect actions included il-
luminating the aircraft, “locking up” with radar, or
ordering the aircraft to divert when the aircraft
was still within its territorial airspace. Incorrect
reporting involved inaccurate reports on the status
of the tactical situation (such as, indicating to the
battle group commander that certain actions had
been taken when they had not, misidentification of
an aircraft, or omitting critical tracks from a re-
port).
Errors of omission categorized under the “loss
of SA” category included: (a) failure to identify or
attend to a contact; (b) failure to take action (e.g.,
to issue “hold-fire” when a contact turned out-
bound); (c) failure to recognize a threat (e.g.,
designating an aircraft as a non-threat because it
had passed its closet point-of-approach, yet it was
still within missile-launch range); (d) instances of
confusion or forgetting (e.g., forgetting or ignor-
ing critical data, forgetting whether or not it had
been warned, illuminated, or “locked-on,” or for-
getting the aircraft's response, or lack of response
to these actions, forgetting the status of a contact,
and confusing contacts); (e) misperception of data
(e.g., reporting a contact as turning outbound
when it is still inbound); (f) unclear communica-
tion (issuing vague orders regarding actions to be
taken by team member, such as, failure to specify
which weapon system is to be used or which con-
tact is to be engaged).
6.4.2  Cognitive explanations
The cause of failures to take required actions
is, in many cases, attributed to the extremely high
task demands levied on the decision maker by the
scenario and the human decision-maker's limited
attentional resources. Many cases are also attrib-
uted to working memory limitations.  Maintaining
an awareness of the status of each contact and the
status of many actions to be taken by the antiair
warfare team—which actions have been taken and
what the contact's response to the action was—
severely taxes the decision maker's working
memory. The high workload entailed in the
scenarios produces a highly time-compressed
decision making situation. This time-compressed
decision making situation—where attentional
resources and working memory capacity are
limited—do not allow the decision maker to
maintain accurate SA for all tracks at any given
time. We anticipate that the decision support
modules in the DSS will mitigate these types of
errors.
Human information processing capabilities are
not well suited to dealing with a "multiplicity of
simultaneous and disjointed tasks. Thoughtful at-
tention is modular:  People can consciously think
about only one thing at a time" (Adams, et al,
1995, p. 92). As a result, they do not handle inter-
ruptions very well. Research indicates that when
an operator is faced with as few as two tasks that
consist of merely the detection or recognition of
simple signals, a cost may be incurred in terms of
a significant loss in sensitivity or time that can be
allocated to either by the requirement to divide or
switch attention between them (Broadbent, 1957;
Schneider and Detweiler, 1988; Swets, 1984).
The memory demands of managing complex,
multi-task situations can easily surpass human
limitations. The decision maker must not forget
any of the contacts or tasks requiring action. In
addition to remembering all the tasks needing at-
tention, however, are the complexities entailed in
keeping track of the data and substeps associated
with each contact and prior action. The aviation
literature provides many examples of incidents
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with explanations similar to the root causes for
errors that were found in the TADMUS program.
One category includes the potentially disastrous
effects of interruptions in the task for air traffic
controllers and pilots. Similarly, in the AAW en-
vironment, momentary intervening attention to
another task or contact, or an interruption in a
procedure can leave the procedure, or processing
of a contact incomplete with potentially cata-
strophic results.
A fairly consistent pattern of tactical decision-
making errors was documented from data col-
lected during the baseline data collection period.
The root causes of these errors were traced to
cognitive mechanisms such as limited attentional
resources and working memory limitations. By
developing an understanding of the pattern and
types of errors most frequently observed in this
task domain we hope to provide a DSS which will
mitigate these errors.
7  Discussion
Failure to take appropriate actions may be ex-
plained by the limited resource capacity of human
memory. In these scenarios a large number of
contacts are monitored for changes in any of sev-
eral key parameters. Three modules in the DSS
are hypothesized to assist with recognizing a
problem and taking the appropriate actions: track
history; response manager; and the track priority
list and alerts.
Features offered by the DSS to address errors
attributed to limited attentional resources include
focusing attention on (1) high priority contacts
(i.e., track priority list and alerts), as well as on (2)
missing data (e.g., basis for assessment), and (3)
enabling the decision maker to use more data than
is typically used in current systems (e.g., track
history, comparison to norms). Current systems
require the user to retain previous contact data in
memory to compare with current values for criti-
cal parameters. Current systems also require the
user to rely on recall of vast amounts of informa-
tion from training and experience. Presenting all
known data on a contact in a synthesized way
should reduce working-memory requirements and
facilitate recognition. Additional potential per-
formance enhancement features, offered by the
DSS, include displaying the complete kinematic
contact history, presenting graphic displays of lo-
cation and trends, highlighting missing data, pro-
viding alerts, and providing assessments of cur-
rent contact identity that go beyond what existing
systems currently present.
Focusing the user's attention on trend and
history data should decrease the cognitive work-
load imposed by these scenarios where many
contacts must be identified and responded to un-
der severe time constraints. Similarly, delineating
trend and history data can assist in the identifica-
tion of a contact where noticing changes in critical
parameters is essential. Presentation of trend and
history data, as well as threat assessment and
comparison to norms, should also mitigate cogni-
tive "tunnel vision" effects where the decision
maker attends to a smaller number of cues when
under stress.
The notion of time is an important character-
istic of situation awareness (Harwood, Barnett,
and Wickens, 1988). The past is critical to under-
standing the present, and both past and present
information must be used to predict future events
(Shrestha, et al, 1995). Endsley (1988) referred to
the "projection of their (perceived elements) status
in the near future" when discussing situational
awareness. However, Endsley also noted the task
of attending to incoming information and subse-
quently predicting future events places a heavy
load on working memory. Several decision sup-
port modules were developed to assist the user in
remaining aware of the contact's history and
changes over time. Remembering which actions
are to be taken at what time levies an additional
burden by placing a heavy load on working mem-
ory. A secondary time savings should be achieved
by the DSS acting as an intelligent "advisor," that
is, by assisting the decision maker in knowing
what actions to take, when to take them, and
which actions have already been taken. A tertiary
time savings can be achieved by including a tem-
plate depicting the weapons' release ranges so the
decision maker does not need to rely on fallible
human memory or query a team member regard-
ing weapons ranges. By graphically depicting a
synthesized view of a contact's kinematic history,
with the focus on changes in the contact's behav-
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ior over time, along with the contact's weapons
envelope in relation to both own-ship's radar and
weapon coverage, information processing time
can be saved for the decision maker.
8  Conclusions
The research reported here focuses on developing
a  DSS which reflects the natural decision-making
strategies of humans. Presenting synthesized in-
formation in the form of graphic presentations is
expected to reduce the cognitive processing load
for the decision maker when performing situation
assessment. The intention is to aid the decision
maker by providing information in a way that will
minimize the need to maintain information in
working memory, reduce information processing
demands, help focus attentional resources on the
highest priority contacts, remind the user of ac-
tions which need to be taken, help make decisions
under stress, and support higher levels of situation
awareness.
Decision support systems require that the hu-
man's strengths be used in synergy with the ad-
vantages offered by the DSS. Limitations associ-
ated with the current generation of automated de-
cision aids include the idea that (1) they cannot
adequately capture the expertise developed by ex-
perience over time and (2) since all contingencies
cannot be anticipated, the expert's abilities to use
intuition is indispensable (Mosier, in press). Mo-
sier's review of the limitations of automated deci-
sion systems delineates the characteristics of hu-
man expertise that surpass the capabilities of
automated systems. These include the human ca-
pacity for creativity, adaptability, the ability to
incorporate experience, the presence of a broad
focus, analogical reasoning, and commonsense
knowledge. The goal for the DSS is to capitalize
on the strengths of the human along with the ad-
vantages provided by the decision support system.
9  Testing the DSS
The prototype DSS display modules are currently
being empirically evaluated in the simulated tacti-
cal environment provided in the DEFTT Labora-
tory. Experienced naval decision makers engage
in experimental scenarios with and without access
to the DSS display. The various decision support
modules will be tested individually and in combi-
nation in future experiments. Data on reduction of
errors, improvements in users' situation awareness
scores, changes in communication patterns, and
subjective responses to the decision support sys-
tem will be collected.
10   Future Research
While tools based on both the RPD and explana-
tion-based reasoning models of decision making
are included in the DSS there is no direct connec-
tion between the two. Research is currently being
conducted to extend schema theory to dynamic
decision-making situations. This involves devel-
oping and testing a hybrid model of cognitive be-
havior in decision making to incorporate both
types of knowledge, i.e., feature matching and
story generation, as elements of the same schema
model of naturalistic decision making (Smith &
Marshall, in press). Schema theory as described
by these authors, offers a context for integrating
these two models which have typically been
viewed as separate entities.
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The requirement to interleave a mul-
tiplicity of tasks—although not necessary
an ongoing characteristic of shipboard
scenarios—represents the type of situation
where providing decision support may
make the critical difference in the outcome
for a scenario. For example, during the
experimental scenarios the decision mak-
ers may have to perform the following:
•  monitor ship location (relative to
other ships and objects in the vicinity)
•  monitor and apply rules of en-
gagement to all applicable tracks in the
local 
       operating area
•
•  receive and send radio messages
to the battle group commander and other 
       operating units in the area
•  monitor tracks on the Aegis dis-
play system and maintain situation 
                   awareness for all contacts of
interest
•  monitor performance of actions
taken by team members to assess the
       situation
•  monitor the tactical action offi-
cer's/commanding officer's performance
•  maintain communications with
CIC team members regarding their




In broad perspective, although team
members spend much of their time in rou-
tine activities, a number of different atten-
tionally demanding, knowledge-intensive,
and procedurally complex tasks may de-
mand attention at any moment. Each of
these tasks is usually triggered by a
stimulus event, such as a communication
from a team member or an alert, and, in
order to obtain proper interpretation, may
require additional information-seeking be-
havior.  The cognitive challenge of select-
ing and interpreting information to main-
tain and revise one's SA is inherently
complex. (Jager, Tenney, and Pew, 1995
HF) Problems arise when, in the dynamic
and multidimensional environments of
some littoral antiair warfare scenarios, the
situation-critical data become more time-
compressed or ambiguous than humans
can handle within the inherent time con-
straints of the evolving scenario.
Resources are such things as processing effort,
the various forms of memory capacity, and
communications channels (Bobrow & Norman,
1975, in Rasmussen et al).
Topics to be discussed include:  (1) a description
of the difficult tasks identified for analysis; (2) the
general methodological approach; (3) develop-
ment of the performance measures and issues
related to their development; (4) discussion of the
; and (5) discussion of the types of errors made by
decision makers and interpretations for the cause
of these errors based in the cognitive psychology
literature.
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tactical operations require decision making
conditions of time pressure, stress, am-
biguous, inaccurate and missing informa-
tion, uncertain communications, and
shifting conditions. These conditions make
it difficult to perform careful analysis prior
to making decisions.  Traditionally, most
decision research and decision support
system development have focused on well-
defined tasks in carefully controlled envi-
ronments.  Recent research has suggested
that tactical decision makers use experi-
ence to generate a likely course of action
and then evaluate its feasibility using
mental simulation.
One way to prevent the same type of casualty
from being repeated is to thoroughly investigate
and analyze root causes of actual mishaps, as well
as data collected in a simulated tactical
environment, and apply the findings in a concrete
manner to improve tactical decision making.
According to the recognition-primed decision-
making (RPD) model, experienced decision
makers can make rapid, high-quality decisions by
associating a situation directly with the actions
that normally work well in that kind of situation.
Roberts, K. H., Stout, S. K., and Halpern, J. J.
(1994)  Decision Dynamics in Two High
Reliability Military Organizations.  Man-
agement Science, Vol. 40, No. 5, May
1994, 614-624.
Tetlock, P. E., Accountability and the Persever-
ance of First Impressions, Social Psycho-
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Tetlock, P. E., Accountability:  The Neglected
Social Context of Judgment and Choice, in
L. L. Cummings and B. M. Straw (Eds.),
Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol.
7, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT, 1985, 297-
332.
The comparison to norms tool is based on a
cognitive model of human information processing
which uses a feature matching strategy.  The
model proposes a data-driven process.  As such,
the comparison to norms tool is a knowledge-
based tool with the knowledge represented as
templates. Each template is a linked timeline
associating individual features, through a series of
feature matches, with expected actions. This
allows the tool to make an assessment of the
situation presented to the decision maker. A
related module is the response manager. This
assessment consists of a categorization of the
situation (e.g., “hostile aircraft attacking”) and
presentation of an associated template. The
response manager module shows a template for an
assessment of the current situation. This is a
timeline display for template features, or events.
Th  response manager module also provide inputs
to the Prioritized track list, Alerts, and Responses
and Tripwires.
SABER is a model of another cognitive
strategy employed in making decisions. This
strategy is known as explanation-based reasoning,
or story generation.  In this approach, available
data are assembled into explanatory structures,
with one structure for each possible conclusion.
Each of the explanations attempts to explain how
every piece of data can be accounted for in
support of each conclusion, even though some of
the data items would naturally contradict reaching
some conclusions. Contradictory data are
explained through the of internal assumptions.  It
is assumed that there are a fixed number of pre-
defined possible conclusions and each data item
points directly to one of those possible conclu-
sio s.
Once the explanations are constructed,
SABER evaluates them to determine which seems
most plausible. Plausibility is based on three
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criteria:  simplicity, completeness, and impor-
tance.  SABER provide data products which relate
data to explanatory hypotheses for the current
situation.  Hypotheses are presented in rank order,
with evidence for and against each hypothesis and
missing data is presented below the corresponding
hypothesis. For a more detailed description of the
DSS the reader is referred to Hair & Pickslay,
1992; Hair, Pickslay, & Chow, 1992; Hutchins
and Rummel, 1994.
Hair, D. C. and Pickslay, K. (1992). Explanation-
Based Reasoning in Decision Support
Systems, Proceedings of the 9th Annual
Conference on Command and Control De-
cision Aids, June 1992, Monterey, CA.
Hair, D. C.,  Pickslay, K. & Chow, S.  (1992)
Explanation-Based Decision Support in
Real Time Situations.  Proceedings of the
1992 IEEE International Conference on
Tools with AI.  Nov. 1992, Arlington, VA.
Various studies have indicated that as much as 90
percent of industrial and system failures are
produced by human error (Senders & Moray,
1991).
At the same time, a shift was occurring in U.S.
Navy doctrine, away from a "blue-water" strategy
to a doctrine of littoral operations aimed at
potentially hostile regional powers.
Tactical decision makers in today's oper-
ating environment are required to perform
complex tasks in a highly dynamic envi-
ronment. Numerous interactive surface
units and aircraft whose parameters are in
flux and which must be continually
sensed, processed, their future status pro-
jected (development of hypotheses re-
garding their future behavior) and actions
taken to assure the successful outcome.
Operating close to land presents additional
challenges to the tactical decision maker.
In littoral (i.e., near-land) settings, which
most likely represent the majority of future
ticipated naval conflicts, the decisions to
be made are even more complex than they
would be in full-scale warfare. When ci-
vilian and neutral nation resources are in
the conflict area incoming information
carries an added element of uncertainty. In
these situations, interpretation of the rules
of engagement, contact identification, de-
termining the capability and possible in-
tent of the potential threat, and the
shoot/no-shoot decision often pose ex-
tremely difficult decision problems. (Since
70 percent of the world's population lives
w thin 200 miles of the sea, most future
contingencies are likely to involve littoral
warfare (Mundy, 1994).)
as opposed to replacing "the user's approach to
the problem" (emphasis in original, Cohen, 1993)
with tools based on decision analysis or
mathematical optimization,
 A considerably smaller number are attributable to
other causes such as mechanical, electrical and
materials failure (Meshkati, 1993).
 The purpose for this phase of the TADMUS
program is to empirically evaluate the effective-
ness of a DSS based on these recent approaches to
decision support
, to the extent possible,
"This focus on why errors occur
is...different from...the typical study of
human errors which solely emphasize what
occurs, a point of view which has received
considerable criticism." (Rouse & Rouse,
1983, p. 539)
Paper presented to the Second International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium,
22
Monterey, Ca.
 DSS which will mitigate typical types of
errors. The objective during this phase of
the research was to develop an under-
standing of the decision-making problems
presented by current and future Navy sce-
narios in order to identify the types and
forms of information that are likely to fa-
cilitate performance of these activities.
Rouse, W. B. & Valusek, J. (1993). Evo-
lutionary Design of Systems to Support
Decision Making.  In G. A. Klein, J.
Orasanu, R. Calderwood, & C. E.
Zsambok (Eds.)  Decision Making in
Action:  Models and Methods  (pp.
270-286).  Ablex Publishing Corpora-
tion, New Jersey.
The Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM)
model (Klein, 1989, 1993) seems more
applicable than traditional decision-
making models to the types of decisions
involved in tactical decision-making.
Early work conducted under the TADMUS
program to determine the cognitive strate-
gies employed by Navy AAW decision-
makers found that when performing situa-
tion assessment 87% of the time a recog-
nitional strategy was used and 13% of the
time story generation was used (Kaempf,
Wolf, and Miller, 1993). We have applied
these new models of human decision
making—which parallel the cognitive
strategies used by domain experts—to the
design of a DSS for enhancing antiair war-
fare tactical decision making. These two
models for situation assessment are feature
matching and story generation.
(The scenarios were intentionally devel-
oped to have many tracks with a high de-
gree of uncertainty associated where it is
not always clear whether a particular track
should be engaged. Our interest in the
TADMUS program was in gaining insight
into and aiding the decision process. The
reader is referred to Hutchins, 1995, for a
detailed coverage of performance meas-
urement issues and scenario development
issues.)
These conditions include dynamic, fluid
situations, time pressure, high risk, multi-
ple decision makers, shifting and compet-
ing goals, action-feedback loops, and
situations with uncertain and incomplete
data (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993).
